Volodymyr Zelenskyy said that Russian troops advanced 10 km toward Kharkiv before Ukrainian forces “stabilized the situation.” Also, boxer Tyson Fury appears to blame Ukraine war for defeat by Oleksandr Usyk.
"Special military operation"[a] (also "special operation", and abbreviated as "SMO" or "SVO"[b] for специальная военная операция) is an official term used by the Russian government and pro-Russian sources to denote the Russian invasion of Ukraine.[1][2][3][4] It is widely considered to be a euphemism created to minimize and obfuscate the true nature of the full-fledged war started by Russia, and to claim Russian victory in the operation no matter the results.[5][6][7][8]
The expression appears prominently in the public address by President of Russia Vladimir Putin titled "On conducting a special military operation", which the Russian leader released on 24 February 2022.
The term "special military operation" has also been widely used in Ukrainian media, generally written in scare quotes, which highlight the psychologically artificial nature of the expression, and applied in the context of describing Russian actions negatively.[5]
en.wikipedia.org/...
Russian forces are likely preparing for the second phase of their offensive operation in northern Kharkiv Oblast, which Russian forces likely intend to launch following their anticipated seizure of Vovchansk. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on May 18 that Russian forces advanced between five and 10 kilometers in northern Kharkiv Oblast before Ukrainian forces stopped Russian advances and that Russian forces are conducting the first of several waves of offensive operations in the area.[15] A second wave of tactical attacks is not the same as the second phase of the operation, and Russian forces may need to launch several "waves" of tactical attacks to achieve the objective of any given singular phase of their offensive operation in northern Kharkiv Oblast. Zelensky stated that the Russian military command seeks to attack Kharkiv City but that Russian forces lack the manpower required to seize such a large city, so Russian forces will slowly push towards Kharkiv City as part of efforts to force Ukrainian forces to withdraw from the area. Available evidence indicates that Russian forces have so far only committed a limited amount of the prepared forces that Russia maintains in Belgorod, Kursk, and Bryansk oblasts for offensive operations in the area.[16] Ukrainian sources previously stated that Russian forces have committed 2,000 personnel to the frontline along the border and have 1,500 to 2,000 personnel in immediate reserve as of May 11.[17] Ukrainian sources, however, have noted that the Russian forces so far committed to offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast may already be degraded after suffering heavy losses.[18] Ukrainian sources have also recently stated that Russian forces are "leasing" limited elements of Russian formations operating in the Svatove area as part of the Western Grouping of Forces but that other Russian forces groupings do not have "free" combat-ready forces or regiment- or brigade-level assets to transfer to the Northern Grouping of Forces to help sustain and intensify Russian offensive operations along the border.[19] The Russian military command is likely not committing available reserves from the Northern Grouping of Forces to current offensive operations because it intends for these elements to support later phases of the offensive operations or subsequent waves of assaults.
www.understandingwar.org/...
Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile attacks in the evening of May 17, overnight from May 17 to 18, and in the morning of May 18 that largely targeted Odesa Oblast. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces launched three ballistic missiles, possibly Iskander-M missiles, and three Kh-59/69 cruise missiles against Odesa City on the night of May 17 and that Ukrainian forces shot down the three Kh-59/69 missiles.[87] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces struck a Ukrainian military warehouse in Odesa City with Iskander missiles on the night of May 17.[88] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces launched 13 Shahed-136/131 drones from Primorsko-Arkhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai, and Kursk Oblast on the night of May 17 to 18 and that Ukrainian forces shot down all 13 drones over Kharkiv, Poltava, Vinnytsia, Mykolaiv, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts.[89] Poltava Oblast Military Administration Head Filip Pronin stated that Russian drones damaged the energy infrastructure in Poltava Oblast.[90] Ukraine's Southern Operational Command reported that Russian forces conducted a ballistic missile strike, possibly with an Iskander-M missile, against Odesa City on the morning of May 18.[91]
www.understandingwar.org/...
Russian forces have recently intensified their effort to seize the operationally significant town of Chasiv Yar, seeking to exploit how Russian offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast and ongoing offensive operations throughout eastern Ukraine have generated greater theater-wide pressure on Ukrainian forces. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted an unsuccessful roughly reinforced company-sized mechanized assault with two tanks and 21 infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) in the direction of the Novyi Microraion in eastern Chasiv Yar on May 17.[1] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted a roughly reinforced platoon-sized mechanized assault in the same area on May 18.[2] Geolocated footage published on May 17 shows Russian forces attacking with at least seven armored vehicles near Ivanivske (east of Chasiv Yar).[3] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that Russian forces are widely using armored vehicles in the Chasiv Yar area, and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenksy thanked Ukrainian forces near Chasiv Yar for destroying at least 20 Russian armored vehicles (presumably over the past day).[4] Russian forces have not made notable tactical gains in the Chasiv Yar area since conducting a company-sized mechanized assault on the town's eastern outskirts on April 4 and have not conducted similar sized-mechanized assaults in the area until May 17.[5] The April 4 mechanized assault was followed by intensified Russian offensive operations near Chasiv Yar, and recent Russian mechanized assaults in the area likely portend an overall intensification of the Russian effort to seize the town.[6] The Russian seizure of Chasiv Yar would be operationally significant since it would provide Russian forces with favorable positions to launch subsequent offensive operations against Kostyantynivka and Druzhkivka, cities that form the southern portion of a Ukrainian defensive belt that is the backbone of Ukraine's defense of Donetsk Oblast.[7]
www.understandingwar.org/...
The battlefield situation in Ukraine will likely get worse for Ukraine before it gets better. The delays in Western materiel deliveries came at the cost of Ukraine’s advantage. Russia is exploiting vulnerabilities across the frontline. Russia seeks to achieve battlefield effects in the remaining window of opportunity before Western military assistance reaches the frontline at scale.
Russia’s main objective, however, is to falsely convince the United States that the aid will not make a difference – especially amid upcoming political milestones, such as the NATO summit, European Parliament elections, and US elections.
Ukraine is likely to be able to stabilize the frontline and blunt the Russian offensive as the aid arrives and Ukraine continues to address its manpower shortages. The supplemental aid package helped avoid a path to the most dangerous outcome and reset a range of possible outcomes for the war that still includes a Russian defeat and Ukrainian victory. Which outcome Ukraine is moving toward depends in no small part on the US learning lessons of the last two years.
Lesson #1: US interests in this war remain unchanged, and so does the most advantageous outcome for the US. This will likely remain true regardless of the ebbs and flows on the battlefield.
Russia is a self-declared adversary to the United States. Any effective US strategy to counter the Russian challenge will recognize the outcome of this war as a center of gravity of Russia’s power and Russia’s ability to threaten US interests. Russia’s ability to reconstitute, to subjugate its neighbors, to confront NATO, to cooperate militarily with its partners like Iran, disproportionately depend on whether Russia keeps or loses its gains in Ukraine. It is not just about Russia’s capability; it is about Russia’s intent too. Putin is not seeking any offramps from his objectives to erase Ukraine a state, to fracture NATO, and to undermine the US. Moreover, the war has empowered an ultra-nationalist community inside of Russia that believes in expansion by force and is inherently anti-Western. If Russia is defeated, the next Russian leader may or may not be worse than Putin. Russian victory in Ukraine is a nearly guaranteed path to another Putin or worse because of the political imperatives that an empowered nationalist community would create.
Given these realities, the most dangerous outcome for the United States is allowing Russia to prevail in this war. The United States would face the worst threat from Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union, as a victorious Russia would emerge reconstituted and more determined to undermine the United States— and confident that it can. The risks of a Russian attack against NATO will rise. The challenge of defending the Baltic States could become almost insurmountable. A Russian victory would diminish America’s deterrence around the world. If Russia wins in Ukraine as a result of diminished US aid, our adversaries would learn that the US can be manipulated into abandoning its interests in a winnable fight. Russia prevailing in Ukraine would constitute a convincing argument for the effectiveness of nuclear blackmail and would likely accelerate nuclear proliferation.
www.understandingwar.org/...